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THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT
POLLUTION CONTROLS
DAVID G. ABLER* & JAMES S. SHORTLE**

Concern for the environmental side effects of agricultural production among policy
makers, regulatory authorities, and the general public has grown significantly in the
U.S. and other developed countries in the last three decades. Environmental problems
linked with agricultural production in the U.S. include nonpoint surface water and

groundwater pollution by fertilizers, pesticides, animal manures, and sedimentation
from eroded soils; loss of flora and fauna due to pesticides; and the conversion of
wetlands to farm land. Of these problems, nonpoint source agricultural water pollution
is widely recognized as one of the "last frontiers" of environmental regulation. There

have been a variety of legislative and regulatory efforts in recent years at the federal
and state levels directed at wetlands, while point sources of water pollution are

covered under the federal Clean Water Act.
Whereas the federal government has taken the lead in point source control, states

have traditionally had authority for dealing with nonpoint source water pollution.
However, it would be fair to say that states have done little with their authority.

Generally speaking, current state laws emphasize voluntary, education and information
approaches, while the mandatory restrictions on production activities that do exist
target so few farmers as to have little effect.' Farmers in all states are potentially
liable for agricultural nonpoint water pollution under common law, while several states

have legislation specifically addressing liability for groundwater contamination.2
* Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1982,
Macalester College; Ph.D., 1987, University of Chicago.
** Professor of Agricultural Economics, Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1975, M.A., 1978,
University of New Mexico; Ph.D., 1981, Iowa State University.
This article was prepared for presentation by the American Agricultural Law Association Conference,
Kansas City, Mo., Nov. 3-4, 1995.
1. State laws adopted between 1972 and 1991 are reviewed briefly by Marc Ribaudo & Danette
Woo, Sumnmary of State Water Quality Laws Affecting Agriculture, in USDA, AGRICULTURAL
RESOURCES: CROPLAND, WATER, AND CONSERVATION 50-54 (Economic Research Serv. AR-23, 1991);
see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEv. (OECD), AGRICULTURAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY COORDINATION: RECENT PROGRESS AND NEw DIRECTIONS 53, 71 (1993).
Useful discussions of recent experiences in specific states include: for Iowa, Rebecca S. Roberts & David
R. Lighthall, The PoliticalEconomy ofAgriculture,GroundwaterQualityManagement, and Agricultural
Research, 27 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 437 (1991); for California, Jacques Franco et al., California's
Experience with a Voluntary Approach to Reducing Nitrate Contamination of Groundwater: The
FertilizerResearch and Education Program(FREP), 49 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 76 (1994);
and for Pennsylvania, Douglas B. Beegle & Les E. Lanyon, Nutrient Management Legislation in
Pennsylvania,49 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 84 (1994).
2. See Terence J. Centner, Blameless Contamination: New State LegislationRegulating Liabilityfor

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:427

However, very few farmers to date appear to have been found liable for environmental
damages.
The debate over Iowa's 1987 Ground Water Protection Act illustrates some of the
unique political hurdles faced at the state level? A proposal to tax pesticides was
defeated in large part by opposition from state chemical dealers and state farmers, who
were understandably wary of restrictions on their own activities that might put them
at a competitive disadvantage relative to other states or countries.4 At the federal
level, concerns about putting one state at a disadvantage relative to others would be
fewer, although concerns about international competitiveness would remain.'
The long-term outlook for more stringent action at the state level is unclear at this
time. However, we would take it as axiomatic that any decision about whether or not
to act, and the specific policy option to pursue if a state decides to act, should be
based on the best available economic information about the merits of alternative policy
options. The objective of this article is to evaluate the economic performance of
alternative methods of controlling nonpoint source agricultural water pollution at the
state level.
Section I reviews the nature and scope of U.S. nonpoint agricultural water pollution
problems. Section HI lays out major policy options, while section II develops some
economic criteria for choosing among the options. Section IV reviews the evidence
on the performance of the various options relative to the criteria. Section V concludes
with some recommerdations for policy makers at the state level.
I. Nonpoint Agricultural Water Pollution
A. Eutrophication
One of the leading surface water quality issues associated with agriculture in many
areas of the U.S. is nutrient pollution by nitrogen and phosphorous. 6 Manufactured

AgriculturalChemicals in Groundwater,45 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 216 (1990); Theodore A.
Feitshans, Liability Issues in Groundwater Quality Protection, 45 1. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 211
(1990).
3. See Roberts & Lighthall, supra note 1, at 439-41. Political factors influencing environmental
policy in general at the state level are discussed by EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS AND PROGRESS INCONTROLLING POLLUTION 80-103 (1993); SHERRY
WISE & STANLEY R. JOHNSON, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE REGULATIONS FOR USE OF
AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL1S, COMMODITY AND RESOURCE POLICIES INAGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS 48-67
(1991).
4. Roberts & Lighthall, supra note 1, at 440.
5. This would be true provided the federal regulations treated producers in different states equally.
If the regulations were designed so as to favor one state over another, such concerns would remain,
Agricultural water qualit) regulations at the federal level might actually benefit farmers if the regulations,
by reducing production, caused a sufficiently large increase in agricultural product prices. See David G.
Abler & James S. Shortle, Environmental and Farm Commodity Linkages in the U.S. and the E.C., 19
EUR. REV. AGRIC. ECON. 197, 209 (1992).
6. For more information on surface water pollution, see generally OECD, WATER POLLUTION BY
FERTILIZERS AND PESTICIDES (1986); USDA, AGRIC. HANDBOOK No. 705, AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS (1994); C.M. Cooper, Biological Effects of Agriculturally Derived
Surface Water Pollutant, on Aquatic Systems - A Review, 22 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 402 (1993).
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fertilizers contain nitrogen and phosphorous (and other nutrients) in varying degrees
according to the type of fertilizer, while animal manure also contains these nutrients.
Generally speaking, not all of the nutrients applied to fields or pasture are taken up
by crops or grass. Nitrates (which are derived from nitrogen) are highly water soluble
and bond only weakly with soil particles. Water running over or through the soil will
remove some soluble nitrates from the soil, where they can leach into groundwater or
run off into surface water. Although phosphates (derived from phosphorus) can also
be leached from the soil, phosphorous is much less mobile in the soil than nitrogen.
Phosphate losses from agricultural land occur primarily by means of soil erosion.
Nutrients that find their way into surface waters can lead to excess nutrient
enrichment and eutrophication. An increase in nitrogen or phosphorous levels in slowmoving waters can stimulate algae growth, and the resulting effects on the aquatic
ecology can be dramatic. As algae blooms and subsequently dies, it takes up dissolved
oxygen, depleting the oxygen available for fish and other aquatic life. It can also
block the sunlight needed by aquatic vegetation, causing the vegetation to die off. This
loss in vegetation then moves up the food chain, leading to the death of fish and other
aquatic life. Eutrophication of freshwater is usually due to phosphates, while nitrates
are usually the cause of coastal water eutrophication. 7 Both nutrients tend to be
important in the eutrophication of estuaries.
A number of recent assessments of water quality problems point to the fact that
eutrophication is not a trivial issue. Among those river miles designated as impaired,
agriculture was identified by the Environmental Protection Agency as a major or
minor contributor in 72% of the cases; the corresponding figures for lakes and
estuaries were 56% and 43%, respectively.8 Agriculture tends to be the major cause
of nutrient pollution in the Corn Belt and Central Plains, and is a large contributor in
many other areas, including the Chesapeake Bay.'
Apart from reducing biodiversity, the loss of aquatic life from eutrophication can
cause significant aesthetic and economic damages. The growth and subsequent
decomposition of algae can be unsightly and generate foul odors, an obvious
disamenity for those living or working near polluted waters. The productivity of
commercial fisheries can be reduced, hurting those in the fishing industry and related
industries. To the extent that this reduces supplies and thereby increases the price of
fish and seafood, consumers are also harmed. Recreational fishing, boating, and
swimming can also suffer, to the detriment of those who enjoy these activities and
those who earn their living from them. To our knowledge no one has made a serious
attempt to quantify the costs (in monetary terms) of eutrophication for the U.S. as a
whole. However, it would be fair to say that the costs of eutrophication are at least
as large as the costs of surface water damages from soil erosion, and as indicated
below, estimates of annual costs of the latter run into the billions of dollars.

7. WORLD RESOURCES INST., WORLD RESOURCES 1992-93, at 162-63, 184-85 (1992).
8. EPA, NATIONAL VATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1992 REPORT TO CONGRESS 3-4 (1994). The

percentages of all waters identified as partially or wholly impaired (regardless of cause) were 38% for
rivers, 44% for lakes, and 32% for estuaries. Id.
9. USDA, supra note 6, at 60-61; WORLD RESOURCES INST., supra note 7, at 188-89.
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B. Sedimentation and Turbidity
In a journey that may take many years, some of the soil blown or washed away
by wind or water erosion moves from fields to waterways."0 The remainder is
redeposited on land somewhere else. Sediment suspended in water increases
turbidity (i.e., it reduces water clarity). Turbidity and sedimentation can cause direct
damage to fish and other aquatic life, while also destroying aquatic habitats. In still
or slow moving waters, turbidity reduces the mixing of oxygen-rich surface water
with deeper water. By blocking sunlight, turbidity also diminishes the production
of oxygen in water through photosynthesis. Sediment can destroy fish eggs and
increase the mortality of the eggs that do hatch. In addition, oysters and clams that
must attach themselves to water bottoms free of heavy mud are at risk. There are
a number of cases from the U.S. where aquatic species populations have been
greatly diminished or destroyed by turbidity and sedimentation."
For all these reasons, turbidity and sedimentation harm those who work in, and
enjoy the benefits of, the commercial and sport fishing industries. Turbidity also
reduces the aesthetic value of water for fishing, boating, and other uses, and it may
also increase the likelihood of swimming and boating accidents. Sedimentation
reduces the storage capacity of reservoirs and increases the costs of maintaining
these facilities. It also fills bays, channels, and harbors. Sedimentation of rivers,
other waterways, and even roadside ditches can increase the likelihood of flooding
and the severity of flooding when it does occur. Sedimentation makes it more
expensive to move water through irrigation systems and aqueducts. It also makes
water treatment much more costly, particularly for drinking water.
Undoubtedly the most ambitious attempt to estimate the costs in monetary terms
of soil erosion was made by Ribaudo 2 . Ribaudo's work has been criticized on a
number of methodological grounds by Smith, 3 and indeed it is hard to take any
particular cost figure too seriously. Be this as it may, Ribaudo's "best" estimate of
the annual cost of soil erosion (in 1989 dollars) from all sources, including
agriculture, is about $9 billion, with a range of estimates of about $5 billion to
about $18 billion.' Ribaudo also estimates that agriculture accounted for about

10. See EDWIN H. CLARK Er AL., ERODING SOILS: THE OFF-FARM IMPACTS (1985).
11. Cooper, supra note 6, at 403-05.
12. See MARC 0. RIBAUDO, WATER QUALITY BENEFITS FROM THE CONSERVATION RESERVE

PROGRAM 4-22 (USDA Agricultural Economic Report No. 606, 1989). The literature in this area is
reviewed by STEPHEN R. CRUTCHFIELD Er AL., THE BENEFITS OF PROTECTING RURAL WATER QUALITY:

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 2-7 (USDA Agricultural Economic Report No. 701, 1995).
13. See V. Kerry Smith, Environmental Costing for Agriculture: Will It be Standard Fare in the
Farm Bill of 2000?, 74 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1076 (1992). Smith's principal criticism is that Ribaudo
measured the cost to society associated with water treatment, dredging, and other activities designed to
mitigate the damages of sedimentation by the costs of carrying out these activities. Id. at 1079.
However, as Ribaudo himself notes, this underestimates the true cost because people generally prefer to
prevent harmful activities such as sedimentation in the first place rather than deal with them after the
fact. See RIBAUDO, supra note 12, at 13.
14. RIBAUDO, supra note 12, at 12.
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53% of gross soil erosion in the U.S. in 1982.11 Even if we use Ribaudo's lower
estimate, it is clear that damages are significant.
C. Drinking Water Contamination
The third main water quality concern associated with agriculture is human health
risks due to drinking water contamination by nitrates and pesticides. 6 One disease
caused by ingestion of nitrates is methemoglobinemia, better known as blue-baby
syndrome because bottle-fed infants less than six months old are particularly
susceptible. This disease, which causes a reduction in the ability of blood to supply
oxygen to the body, can lead to death. The incidence of this disease is unknown,
but it is considered to be very rare. Nitrates are also suspected as a cause of cancer.
They can react with other chemicals in the body to form N-nitrosamines, which are
known to cause cancer in laboratory animals. However, there is no known
relationship between human cancer and these compounds.
Like nutrients, there are a variety of possible fates for pesticides applied to fields
and orchards. Pesticides can leach into groundwater or, when dissolved in runoff
water or attached to eroded soil particles, wash into streams, rivers, lakes, and
estuaries. Pesticides can also find their way into water resources via direct
application to control aquatic weeds, wind drift, or overspray from aerial applications. The cleaning of application equipment or disposing of unused products into
wells can pollute water resources as well.
The overall state of knowledge about the chronic effects of pesticides and
pesticide residues on human health is quite limited, but concern has been raised
about the consequences of low exposures over long periods of time. One cause for
this concern is the fact that farmers and farm workers involved in the handling,
mixing, and application of pesticides tend to have a higher incidence of lung cancer
and other types of cancer."
In recent years there have been several studies of the willingness of the general
public to pay for drinking water free of nitrates, pesticides, and/or other agricultural

15. RIBAUDO, supra note 12, at 6. Agriculture's percentage of the costs of soil erosion would not
necessarily be 53% of the figures above, but would instead depend on the percentage of erosion from
agricultural sources that finds its way to water resources, the uses to which those resources are put, and
other factors. Id. at 9-11.
16. For more information on health risks from nitrates, see KENNETH P. CANTOR El AL., HEALTH
EFFECTS OF AGRICHEMICALS IN GROUNDWATER: WHAT Do WVE
KNOW? AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS
AND GROUNDWATER PROTECTION: EMERGING MANAGEMENT AND POLICY (1987); SIDNEY S. MIRVISH,
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR HUMAN HEALTH OF NITRATE, NITRITE, AND N-NITRoso COMPOUNDS, NITRATE
CONTAMINATION: EXPOSURE, CONSEQUENCE, AND CONTROL (1991). Formore on groundwater pollution
from nitrates and pesticides, see generally OECD, supra note 5; USDA, supranote 6; EPA, supranote
6; ELIZABETH G. NIELSEN & LINDA K. LEE, TEE MAGNITUDE AND COSTS OF GROUNDWATER
CONTAMINATION FROM AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS (USDA Agric. Economic Report No. 576) (1987);
Roy F. Spalding & Mary E. Exner, Occurrence of Nitrate in Groundwater- A Review, 22 J. ENVTL.
QUALTY 392 (1993).
17. See CANTOR, supranote 16, at 31-37; Council on Scientific Affairs, Cancer Risk of Pesticides
in AgriculturalWorkers, 260 JAMA 959,960-63 (1988); VORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH IMPACT
OF PESTICIDES USED INAGRICULTURE 53 (1990).
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pollutants." These studies use the so-called "contingent valuation" method, in

which people are asked how much (in monetary terms) cleaner water would be
worth to them. 9 Estimates of the average willingness to pay per household, per

year, for drinking water free of one or more agricultural pollutants range from less
than $50 to more than $1,000. While figures in the neighborhood of $1,000 are
simply too large to be credible, even $50 becomes significant when multiplied by
thousands or millions of households.
II. The Policy Options
Environmental regulation in the U.S., like most environmental regulation
worldwide, is characterized by a "command and control" mentality: producers are
generally told not only what standards are required but also what must be done to

meet those standards, in some cases specifying in great detail the actions to be taken
to prevent or mitigate pollution.' The command and control approach is certainly

one option to limit agricultural nonpoint water pollution, but even within this realm
there are a wide variety of choices in terms of what to regulate and how to regulate

it. This section lays out some of the policy options available at the state level.
A. The Nonpoint Nature of the Problem
Agricultural pollutants are nonpoint source pollutants, meaning they reach surface
water and groundwater by diffuse and indirect pathways that are very difficult to

predict or model in advance. The timing, frequency, and intensity of precipitation,
which of course are unknown in advance, are critical in this regard. Soil characteristics (e.g., depth, density, and permeability) are also critical, and although these are
measurable in principle they are often unknown in practice. In some cases, there

may be long time lag; (years or even decades) between polluting activities and the
actual movement of pollutants into water resources.

The nonpoint character of agricultural water pollution places severe constraints
on the options available to policy makers. One cannot control nonpoint pollution in
the way, for example. that one can control the flow of sewage coming out of a pipe

18. These studies are summarized in CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 12, at 2-7; Kevin J. Boyle et al.,
What Do We Know About Groundwater Values? Preliminary Implicationsfrom a Meta Analysis of
Contingent-ValuationStudies, 76 AM. J. AGRiC. ECON. 1055, 1057-61 (1994).
19. Contingent valuation has been heavily criticized by some economists because the issues covered
are often unfamiliar to people, because the time constraints inherent in any survey may limit the quality
of responses, and because of the hypothetical rature of the questions. Since survey respondents have
nothing to lose or gain, they may not think carefully about their answers or may not even tell the truth.
However, proponents argue that contingent valuation can provide useful information provided that
surveys are properly constructed and administered. See Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman,
Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994); W.
Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contingent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19
(1994); Paul R. Portney, The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care, 8 J. EcON.

PPsp. 3 (1994).
20. Some of the reasons for this are discussed in OECD, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE
OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS 35-40 (1994) [hereinafter OECD, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT).
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or pollutants coming out of a smokestack. The only options are to either (1) target
farm-level decision variables that are known to be correlated to at least some degree
with agricultural water pollution (e.g., the timing of manure applications), or (2)
target estimates of the flows of nonpoint pollutants as opposed to the actual
flows.2
Estimates of pollution flows could be quite crude or quite sophisticated. One long
advocated proxy for targeting water quality problems caused by soil erosion,
including phosphorous enrichment, is gross soil erosion as estimated by the
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) or modified versions of the USLE.' An
analogous proxy that has been proposed for nitrate losses is the excess of
manageable nitrogen applied over nitrogen removed by crops.' Estimates of excess
nitrogen in practice tend to assume fixed nitrogen uptake coefficients for crops as
well as fixed nitrogen delivery coefficients per pound of fertilizer and per animal
in the form of manure. At the more sophisticated end of the spectrum, several fieldlevel simulation models have been developed and widely used to estimate nutrient
leaching and runoff, pesticide leaching and runoff, and erosion, using information
on farm management practices, the weather, soil characteristics, and other relevant
factors.'
B. Direct vs. Indirect Policies
An initial distinction among policy options would be between direct and indirect
policies. Direct policies are those that give farmers a clear reason, of one sort or
another, to change production practices so as to reduce pollution. These are policies
that deal with the problem at the source, so to speak. An example would be a
policy to reduce water pollution from manure through a limit on the number of
livestock allowed per acre. Indirect policies, on the other hand, are those where the
incentive to reduce pollution is not a clear and immediate result of government
policy. Pollution may be reduced, but only through a chain of actions initiated by
the policy that, in the end, induce farmers to voluntarily change production
practices.
A good example of an indirect policy is research and development. For instance,
government-funded R&D on alternatives to insecticides might lead to new crop
varieties that are sufficiently pest-resistant to cut the use of insecticides, but this
could take many years and would depend on farmers voluntarily adopting the new
varieties, something that could hardly be guaranteed in advance. R&D has
nevertheless attracted considerable interest because it appears, to many, to be a
relatively "painless" way of cutting agricultural nonpoint pollution without forcing

21. See James S. Shortle, The Use of Estimated Pollution Flows in Agricultural Pollution Control
Policy: Implicationsfor Abatement and Policy Instruments, 13 NE. J. AGRIC. & REsOURCE ECON. 277
(1984).
22. USDA, supra note 6, at 29.
23. Iat at 71.
24. See GAO, GROUNDWATER PROTECTION: VALIDITY AND FEASIBILITY OF EPA's DIFFERENTIAL
PROTECTION STRATEGY (1993) (GAO/PEMD-93-6); Donn G. DeCoursey, Mathematical Models for
Nonpoint Water Pollution Control, 4 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 408 (1985).
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farmers to do anything. Proponents of R&D note that both public and private
agricultural research in the U.S. since World War II have been biased in favor of
the development of chemical-intensive production techniques.' Thus, according to
these proponents, we need a reorientation of the public agricultural research system
if not also the private system.
Another popular indirect policy option is information and education programs.
These programs provide farmers with information on practices for reducing nonpoint
pollution, technical assistance in the adoption on these practices, or attempt to
persuade farmers to adopt these practices. For instance, alternative production
practices such as integrated pest management (IPM) and conservation tillage are
currently important components of extension programs at state land grant
institutions. Basic 1?M practices, such as pest scouting to determine whether it
would be profitable to apply pesticides, are now used by a significant fraction of
farmers, although use of more sophisticated IPM techniques has been limited.'6
Conservation tillage is now being used by a significant fraction of grain producers,
even on land classified as non-highly erodible and thus outside the purview of
federal conservation compliance and "sodbuster" programs.'
C. Direct Regulation vs. Incentives
For economists, perhaps the most important distinction within the realm of direct
policies is between direct regulation and incentive-based approaches. With direct
regulation, farmers are told either what to do in order to reduce pollution or the cut
in estimated pollution flows that is somehow expected of them. Failing to comply
with the standards is a violation of the law, with all the civil or criminal penalties
that this entails. For example, the law may prohibit the use of a certain pesticide.
Incentives, on the other hand, either levy financial penalties on farmers for refusing
to do what the law recommends or give farmers financial rewards for following the
law's recommendations. Failing to follow the recommendations is not a violation
of the law. If farmers voluntarily choose to pay the penalties or forgo the rewards,
so be it. For example, a charge might be imposed on nitrogen fertilizer applications
that exceed some per-acre threshold.
Direct regulation takes two basic forms: design standards and performance
standards. Design standards tell producers specifically what to do in order to reduce
pollution. Performance standards, on the other hand, give producers a pollution

25. Probably the best-known exposition of this point is NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE (1989). Several studies support the contention that public and private
research and development have favored chemical-intensive practices. See, e.g., John M. Antic, The
Structure of U.S. Agricultural Technology, 1910-78, 66 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 414 (1984); Wallace E.
Huffman & Robert E. Evenson, Supply and DemandFunctionsfor MultiproductU.S. Cash GrainFarns:
Biases Caused by Research and OtherPolicies,71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 761 (1989); Chris Fawson &
C. Richard Shurmway, Endogenous Regional AgriculturalProductionTechnologies, 24 APPLIED ECON.
1263 (1992).
26. See ANN VANDEMAN Er AL., ADOPTION OF INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT IN U.S.
AGRICULTURE (USDA Agric. Information Bulletin No. 707) (1994).
27. USDA, supra note 6, at 125.
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reduction target to achieve but leave it up to them as to how to achieve it.
Examples of design standards would be restrictions on the timing, rate, and location
of manure applications to the soil. A corresponding performance standard would be
a limit on the estimated amount of nitrate runoff or leaching caused by the manure.
Design standards are the essence of the command-and-control approach that is so
common to environmental policy. This approach has brought several terms into the
vocabulary of pollution control policy referring to prescribed techniques, including
Best Practicable Technology (BPT), Best Available Control Technology (BACT),
and, particularly in agriculture, Best Management Practices (BMPs).
Incentive-based approaches, like direct regulation, can take two basic forms:
design incentives and performance incentives. Following the example above, instead
of imposing restrictions on manure application practices (design standard), we could
give a subsidy to farmers who follow recommended practices or levy a charge on
those who fail to do so (design incentive). Rather than mandating a limit on
estimated nitrate runoff or leaching (performance standard), we could give a subsidy
to farmers who fall within the limit or levy a charge on those who fail to do so
(performance incentive).
Within the realm of design incentives or performance incentives, one can
distinguish between subsidies and taxes (or charges). In terms of their impact on a
farmer's production decisions, these two options can be viewed as different sides of
the same coin. For example, suppose that current rate of nitrogen fertilizer
application on corn, on a particular farm, is 175 pounds per acre (lb/ac), and that
we wish to reduce this to 125. One option would be a tax of, say, $0.50 on every
pound of fertilizer used above 125 lb/ac. Another option would be a subsidy of
$0.50 on every pound of fertilizer below 175 lb/ac not used, down to the target of
125 lb/ac. In either case, the farmer gives up $0.50 for every pound of fertilizer
used between 125 lb/ac and 175 lb/ac. The difference between the two options is
of course that farmers gain with subsidies and lose with taxes, while the government
loses money with subsidies and earns money with taxes."
Performance standards and performance incentives could measure performance
in a variety of ways. As noted above, one could use rough estimates of performance, such as the USLE or excess nitrogen, or one could use more complicated
estimates derived from a field-level simulation model of nonpoint pollution flows.
D. Marketable Permits
The basic economic reason why nonpoint agricultural pollution is a problem to
society at large is that it is an externality. Absent government policies of one type
or another, the costs imposed on others never show up on a farmer's bottom line.
In lieu of direct regulation or incentives, one option is to create a "market" in

28. The environmental benefits and drawbacks of several BMPs are reviewed briefly by Terry J.
Logan, AgriculturalBest ManagementPracticesfor WaterPollution Control: CurrentIssues, 46 AGRIC.,
EcosYsTEMs & ENv'T 223 (1993).
29. If farmers did not gain from the subsidies, they would forego them and continue with their
previous production practices.
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pollution through tradeable permits in estimated emissions or tradeable quotas in
farm-level decision variables correlated with pollution (e.g., nitrogen fertilizer).
Farmers would be required to have permits specifying their allowable pollution
discharge levels or their allowable levels of input usage. The total supply of permits
would be limited to some fixed value so that environmental quality goals would be
achieved." The initial allocation of permits among farms could be based on
historical patterns of production, input usage, or estimated emissions.' However,
unlike conventional permit systems, farmers would be able to trade permits among
themselves as they so desired. Farmers who could limit emissions or input usage
at a relatively low cost would have an incentive to use fewer than their allowed
number of permits in order to be able to sell their surplus to other farmers who
could not control pollution so easily.
Marketable permit schemes have, for the most part, been more theory than reality.
However, in recent years the U.S. has begun experimenting with them to control air
and water pollution, regulate the lead and oxygen in gasoline, and maintain
wetlands."
Iff. Economic Criteriafor Policy Evaluation
In this section we review some important economic criteria in evaluating
environmental policies for agriculture. We recognize that there are a variety of other
criteria that can and should be used which are not discussed here, including federal
and state constitutional considerations, distributional impacts (the distribution of
benefits and costs of pollution control among various groups), political feasibility,
and ethical considerations (e.g., environmental ethics).3
A. Cost-Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency
Environmental protection involves both benefits and costs. The benefits in this
case derive from preventing eutrophication, sedimentation, or drinking water
contamination. The costs in this case are the private and public sector activities

30. A more complicated marketable permits scheme was developed by Marc J. Roberts & Michael
Spence, Effluent Chargesand Licenses under Uncertainty, 5. J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1976). This scheme
was considered in the context of nonpoint source pollution by JAMES S. SHORTLE & DAVID G. ABLER,
INCENTIVES FOR NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL, NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION REGULATION: ISSUES
AND ANALYSIS (1994). The total number of permits is not fixed with this option. Rather, producers
receive a subsidy for each one of their permits that they return to the regulatory agency and can also
purchase additional rights from the agency.
31. Permits could also be allocated initially in some other manner so as to satisfy equity or political
concerns. Alternatively, initial permit rights could be auctioned off to the highest bidder.
32. See OECD, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 15.
33. Political and economic considerations are discussed in David G. Abler & James S. Shortle, The
Political Economy of Water Quality Protectionfrom Agricultural Chemicals, 20 NE. J. AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. 53 (1991). Legal, political, and economic factors are discussed in JAMES S. SHORTLE
Er AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROUNDWATER PROTECTION, NON-POINT WATER QUALITY
-CONCERNS - LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS (1989). For the specific case of pesticides, see Erik
Lichtenberg, Alternative Approaches to Pesticide Regulation, 21 NE. J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 83
(1992).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss2/13

1995]

ALTERNATIVE POLLUTION CONTROLS

which must be foregone because resources are being devoted to protecting water
quality. Net benefits are the difference, in monetary terms, between benefits and
costs.
Cost-effectiveness refers to the ability of a policy to achieve environmental
protection goals at the lowest possible cost to society as a whole. One policy
instrument is more cost-effective than another if it can achieve a given reduction in
agricultural pollution at a lower cost. Economic efficiency refers to setting
environmental protection goals so as to maximize net benefits to society as a whole.
One policy is more efficient than another if it generates a higher net benefit.
Economic efficiency is the more fundamental consideration because it addresses the
choice of both the optimal level of environmental protection and the instruments to
be used to achieve that protection, whereas cost-effectiveness takes the level of
protection as a given. However, because quantitative information on the benefits of
environmental protection is usually limited, as is the case for agriculture, costeffectiveness can often be more easily determined.
A thorough economic analysis of the economic efficiency or cost-effectiveness
of any policy option in a particular watershed would require an intensive study of
the economic and biophysical systems involved.' Agricultural nonpoint water
pollution is very site-specific: farming causes problems within some watersheds but
not others, and within watersheds some farmers may generate more pollution than
others. Because of this, the numbers coming out of any study would be specific to
the watershed analyzed, making generalizations difficult. Thus, our approach here
is to lay out some general factors that experience has shown are important
determinants of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 5
1. Environmental Impact
One key consideration is the potential impact on the environment. All of the
policy options listed above are obviously intended to have some impact. However,
as discussed below, some might have so little impact that they fail to attain
pollution reduction goals, others might improve some environmental problems while
making others worse, while still others might actually be unambiguously bad for the
environment.

34. The steps involved in such an analysis would be: (1) estimating the impacts of the policy
instruments on the production choices of farms and the corresponding costs to farms and others; (2)
estimating the impacts of these behavioral changes on the proximate causes of environmental
degradation; (3) estimating the impacts of changes in these proximate causes on environmental
conditions; (4) estimating the impacts of changes in environmental conditions on "outcomes" such as
public health, flora and fauna, etc.; and, for economic efficiency but not cost-effectiveness, (5) estimating
the economic value of the changes in these outcomes.
35. A general discussion of these factors is found in Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates,
Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 675 (1992). For the specific case of
nonpoint source pollution, see JOHN B. BRADEN & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN
THE DESIGN OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION POLICY, THEORY, MODELING AND EXPERIENCE IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION (1993).
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In general, the environmental impact of a policy instrument depends on its effects
on farm-level decision variables (e.g., nitrogen fertilizer application rates) that are
correlated with environmental damages. Because of the site-specific nature of
agricultural nonpoint pollution, the environmental impact also depends on the degree
to which the policy targets farms causing pollution problems. Targeting in time can
be important as well. For instance, the timing of manure applications can be at least
as important as the volume of manure applications in affecting environmental losses
of manure nutrients. Manure spread on frozen, snow-covered ground during the
winter may be washed into streams with spring thaws, whereas application and
incorporation during the growing season would permit crops to make use of manure
nutrients.
In addition, the environmental impact of a policy depends on the magnitudes of
the correlations between variables targeted by the policy option and environmental
damages. Other things equal, a policy instrument will be more cost-effective and
more efficient the stronger the association between the variables controlled and
water pollution. It would be possible for a well-targeted policy, that has a strong
effect on variables correlated with water pollution, to have little environmental
impact if the magnitudes of the correlations were low. Similarly, it would be
possible for a policy that targets variables highly correlated with water pollution to
have little environmental impact if the policy had little effect on those variables.
2. Farm-Level Incentive Effects
Another critical factor in determining economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness
is farm-level incentive effects. Does the policy give each farmer an incentive to
control pollution in the way that is least expensive to society as a whole, or does
it force or induce farmers to choose more expensive pollution control methods?
Two policy options that yield the same reduction in pollution might have radically
different costs to society as a whole. For example, a limit on livestock densities per
acre of pasture and a limit on manure applications per acre of crop land could, in
principle, each be structured to achieve the same estimated reduction in nitrate
emissions. However, the economic impacts of these two options on livestock and
crop production could be quite different, and there is no reason to assume that their
social costs would be the same.
3. Inter-FarmAllocative Effects
Another critical factor in determining economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness
is inter-farm allocative effects. Does the policy allocate the total reduction in
pollution across farms in the least expensive manner to society as a whole? For
example, suppose we wish to reduce the estimated leaching of some pesticide in a
particular watershed by 50%. It does not logically follow that each and every farm
in that watershed should reduce its estimated leaching by 50%. Some farms might
be able, for any number of reasons, to cut their leaching much less expensively than
others. In order to maximize the net benefits of pollution control to society as a
whole, those producers who can clean up more cheaply should do more of the
cleaning up. In fact, the least expensive option to society as a whole might actually
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involve putting some producers out of business entirely while letting others continue
as they had before, without any changes in production practices.
The livestock densities versus manure applications example above illustrates how
two policies designed to achieve the same reduction in estimated nitrate emissions
would allocate the reduction across farms quite differently from each other.
Livestock producers who did not have any crop land or who were not applying
much manure to their crops would not be affected at all by the manure application
restrictions but could be affected quite significantly by the density restrictions.
4. Administrative, Enforcement, and Compliance Costs
Effective environmental programs require institutional infrastructure and resources
for design, implementation, evaluation, monitoring, and enforcement. These costs
must therefore be considered when choosing between alternative approaches. This
is particularly true in agriculture. Unlike many other industries, agriculture is not
dominated by a few firms with a small number of plants. Other things equal,
administration and enforcement are comparatively easy when the number of firms
or plants to be monitored is small. Rather, agriculture is characterized by a large
number of small, heterogenous, geographically dispersed producers. In general,
administrative and enforcement costs depend on the amount of information required
to implement (and as necessary, periodically revise) the instrument, the amount of
information required to monitor compliance, incentives for noncompliance, the costs
of sanctioning violators, and the administrative capability of regulatory agencies.
Compliance costs are also potentially significant. Some policy options could
entail fairly onerous record-keeping and reporting requirements for farmers, whereas
compliance with others could be fairly easy. In general, compliance costs depend
on the amount of information required to comply with the law.
5. Innovation Effects
The final factor that we consider here is innovation effects. Does the policy
stimulate the development of "environmentally friendly" production technologies,
or do producers gain nothing by switching technologies?" Environmentally
friendly technologies are those that permit producers to control pollution less
expensively than current technologies. R&D is the only policy option listed above
that specifically seeks to develop alternative technologies. However, other policies
might indirectly encourage more environmentally friendly R&D in the private and
public sectors.
For example, a tax on pesticides would encourage producers to use fewer
pesticides. This could be accomplished to some extent by taking greater advantage

36. The general process of technology responding to economic incentives created by public policy
or other forces is known as induced innovation. For discussions of the potential for environmental policy
to stimulate the development of new technologies, see Susse Georg et al., Clean Technology Innovation and Environmental Regulation, 2 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 533 (1992); Ren6 Kemp et al.,
Supply and Demand Factorsof CleanerTechnologies: Some EmpiricalEvidence, 2 ENVTL. & RESOURCE
ECON. 615 (1992).
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of off-the-shelf alternatives like IPM. However, private seed companies would
probably still see the pesticide tax as enlarging the market for crop varieties with
more built-in pest resistance, and as such would increase their R&D in this area.
Similarly, private firms in the business of supplying the beneficial insects used as
part of many IPM programs would be encouraged to do even more work in
selectively breeding insects with desirable properties. Whether researchers in the
public sector would also be encouraged to do more environmentally friendly R&D
is hard to say. Unlike the private sector, the public sector rarely has a clear bottom
line on which to base decisions. In any event, about 70% of U.S. agricultural
research is conducted by the private sector.37
B. Environmental Risk
Policy options are likely to vary with respect to their ability to offer reliable
environmental protection. Even a policy that performs well with respect to
environmental protection goals, on average (good environmental impact), might do
very well some of the time and very poorly at other times (high environmental risk).
For example, one could be reasonably sure that farms would comply with a
restriction on the use of a specific pesticide, provided it were adequately enforced.
On the other hand, farm-level responses to economic instruments such as taxes and
subsidies could vary across space and time. For example, the degree to which a tax
on a specific pesticide reduced pesticide usage would depend on the total cost of the
pesticide, including the tax, relative to what farmers could expect to gain if they
went ahead and used the pesticide anyway. The latter, in turn, would be a function
of the anticipated effectiveness of the pesticide and the anticipated prices of the
agricultural products on which the pesticide was used, both of which could vary
significantly from one year to another.
Environmental policy in the U.S. suggests a strong "revealed preference" for
certainty in environmental protection. For example, EPA pesticide regulations
designed to protect worker safety are based on very cautious estimates of the
potency of pesticides, the number of years of exposure among those who work with
pesticides, and the intensity of exposure per year."8 However, the degree to which
this apparent aversion to risk is due to distortions in regulatory and legislative
processes, a failure to adequately educate the public about risks, or a genuine public
dislike of risk is the subject of much debate."

37. See WALLACE E HUFFMAN & ROBERT E. EVENSON, SCIENCE FOR AGRICULTURE: A LONGTERM PERSPECTIVE 96 (1993).
38. Carolyn R. Harper & David Zilberman, Pesticidesand Worker Safety, 74 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
68, 73-74 (1992); see also Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A
StatisticalAnalysis of EPA Decisionmaking, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175 (1992).
1 39. Some of the diverse points of view on this issue can be found in COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STRENGTHENING RISK ASSESSMENT WITHIN EPA
(1994). See, e.g., id. at 10-18 (viewpoint of Sally Katzen); id. at 59-80 (viewpoint of Ellen K.
Silbergeld); id. at 102-19 (viewpoint of Chemical Manufacturers Association).
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IV Economic Performance of the Policy Options
A. Research and Development
The environmental impact of R&D as an agricultural pollution control policy
depends on whether and when researchers are able to develop profitable alternatives
to agricultural chemicals in crop production and management practices associated
with pollution. It is generally accepted that R&D has not yielded any practical,
large-scale substitutes for agricultural chemicals. There are many promising
possibilities, particularly involving genetic engineering, but development will
probably require many years.'
The environmental impact of R&D also depends on whether alternatives to
agricultural chemicals would actually reduce agricultural chemical usage. Suppose
a new variety of corn were developed with a built-in toxin to corn rootworm,
reducing the need for insecticides to achieve any given level of control of this pest.
Also suppose that the new variety, taking into account the reduced insecticide usage
per acre, were less costly to producers than current varieties, so that it were widely
adopted. At the market level, competition among corn producers would pass the
reduction in the cost of production along to consumers in the form of lower corn
prices, which would stimulate the demand for corn. If this stimulus were great
enough, the result could be perverse. Producers might actually increase insecticide
use in order to all the more effectively control rootworm and thus all the more
effectively meet the expanded demand for corn. Previous research indicates that
alternative production technologies could actually work to increase fertilizer and
pesticide usage through mechanisms such as this.4 Moreover, returning to the corn
rootworm example, producers might have an incentive to switch lands from other
crops to corn, which is significant because corn is among the most chemicalintensive of all crops. 2
B. Information and Education
The potential environmental impact of information and education, like R&D, must
be rated as limited. Without good alternatives, significant changes in existing farm
management practices would offer only small or even negative economic gains to
farmers 3 One could argue that farmers should change production practices in

40. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, TECHNICAL PAPER No. 133, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE

NEXT "GREEN REVOLUrTON"? 23 (1991). Existing alternatives to agricultural chemicals are discussed
in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 135-64.
41. David G. Abler & James S. Shortle, Technology as an AgriculturalPollution Control Policy,
77 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 20, 26-28 (1995).
42. See USDA, supra note 6, at 83-85. 95-98. In general, shifting acreage from one crop to another
might be good or bad for the environment depending on fertilizer usage, pesticide usage, and
management practices for each crop.
43. See Glenn Fox et al., ComparativeEconomics ofAlternative AgriculturalProduction Systems:
A Review, 20 NE. J. AGRIC. & RESouRcE ECON. 124 (1991); Linda K. Lee, A Perspective on the
Economic Impacts of Reducing AgriculturalChemical Use, 7 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE AGRIC. 82 (1992).
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order to protect their own water supplies from contamination (at least those farmers
with private, on-farm wells) or protect their own health from pesticides. Here too,
however, the perceived benefits to farmers of significant changes in practices would
be small.M The conclusion is that information and education cannot be relied on
to protect water quality. They can help, but real improvements in water quality will
require regulatory measures or economic incentives.
C. Direct Regulation
1. Design Standard-;
The environmental impact of design standards depends in large measure on the
farm-level variables targeted by the standards and the particular site subject to the
standards. Some variables might be highly correlated with water pollution on certain
farms and at certain times but not correlated, at all, on other farms or at other times.
For example, simulation analyses indicate that restrictions on nitrogen timing and
application rates targeted toward intensively managed farms with surplus nitrogen
can significantly cut leaching and runoff at a relatively low cost, although broader
restrictions on nitrogen use applied to an entire watershed would do little to reduce
pollution and would be significantly more costly 5
Design standards in practice often involve mandated use of particular Best
Management Practices (BMPs). However, the environmental impacts of some BMPs
are not unambiguously positive.' For example, conservation tillage, contouring,
filter strips, and strip cropping, all tend to reduce erosion and the volume of runoff
at the expense of additional leaching and higher pollutant concentrations in the
runoff that does occur. This reflects the simple fact that excess nutrients have to go
somewhere; if not into surface waters then perhaps into groundwater.4' Whether
or not this shift in pallution from one outlet to another is viewed as acceptable
depends on the relative social costs in a particular watershed of erosion and runoff
versus leaching. Regulators mandating one or more of these four BMPs but still
seeking to reduce leaching would have to mandate other BMPs or implement some
other pollution control policy.
The performance of different policy options in regard to farm-level incentive
effects depends on the information available to farmers as opposed to regulators.
If regulators had better information than farmers about the costs and efficacy of
changes in farm-level variables needed to meet environmental protection goals, then
design standards would be the preferred choice in giving farms proper incentives to

44. See E. Douglas B ach & Gerald A. Carlson, A Hedonic Analysis of Herbicides: Do UserSafety
and Water Quality Matter?, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 612 (1993).
45. See, e.g., Scott L. Johnson et al., The On-Farm Costs of Reducing Ground Water Pollution, 73
AM. J. AGRIC. EON. 1053 (1991); Harry P. Mapp et al., Economic and Environmental Impacts of
Limiting Nitrogen Use to Protect Water Quality: A Stochastic Regional Analysis, 76 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 889 (1994); Michael L. Taylor et al., Farm-Level Response to Agricultural Effluent Control
Strategies: The Case of tlx Willamette Valley, 17 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 173 (1992).
46. See Logan, supra note 28, at 228.
47. Nitrogen can also be lost to the atmosphere through processes known as denitrification and
volatilization.
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control pollution. However, farms are very heterogenous, and it is unrealistic to
expect a regulatory agency to know more about the soils, weather, pests, etc. on a
particular farm than the operator of that farm. Regulatory agencies are likely, in
fact, to have very poor information about individual farms. Design standards
prevent farmers from using their specialized information to figure out cheaper ways
of achieving pollution reduction goals than those mandated by the standards. They
therefore rate poorly in terms of farm-level incentive effects.48 For similar reasons,
design standards also rate poorly in regard to inter-farm allocative effects.
Regulators with little information cannot be expected to set standards that
correspond to the relative costs of pollution control across farms.
Design standards perform better than most other regulatory and incentive options
in terms of administration and enforcement costs. There is no need to monitor or
estimate pollution flows at the farm level, as would be necessary with performance
standards or performance incentives. Nor is there any need to determine the level
of incentives needed to achieve the desired results. On the other hand, they perform
worse than most other options with respect to innovation effects. They would tend
to encourage innovation to enable farmers to more profitably comply with the
standards, but innovations directed at methods of pollution control, not on the list
of approved or required methods, would be discouraged.
2. PerformanceStandards
Performance standards are preferable to design standards on a number of grounds.
They are ranked highly with respect to farm-level incentive effects because they
give farmers an inducement to use their specialized information to minimize costs
while still attaining pollution reduction goals. Performance standards are also ranked
well in regard to innovation effects because they give farmers the ability to adopt
lower-cost methods of pollution control, thereby stimulating the demand for R&D
to develop such methods. Performance standards score poorly on inter-farm
allocative effects because regulators lack the information necessary to more strictly
target the farms that can control pollution at lower costs. However, performance
standards are no worse than design standards in this regard.
Performance standards excel at minimizing environmental risk. Provided that
performance is measured accurately and properly enforced, regulators can be certain
that water quality protection goals will be met, leaving aside unforseen variations
due to the weather and other random factors. Design standards can approach this
level of certainty provided that the variables targeted by the standards are closely
correlated with pollution flows.
The Achilles heel of performance standards is the accuracy and cost of estimates
of nonpoint water pollution flows. Accuracy is essential if this approach is to have
a positive environmental impact, withstand legal challenge, and gain policy
legitimacy. Crude proxies such as the USLE have obvious limitations.49 At the
48. Simulation results in this regard may be found in William T. McSweeny & James S. Shortle,
ProbabilisticCost Effectiveness in AgriculturalNonpoint Pollution Control,22 S. J. AGRIC. ECON. 95,
100-01 (1990).
49. See, e.g., STEFANO PAGIOLA, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF SOIL CONSERvATION, ECONOMIC AND
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same time, more sophisticated field-level simulation models would require an
enormous amount of information and computing resources to be applied to the
hundreds or thousands of farms in a typical watershed. If the regulatory agency
collected this information and supplied the computing resources, administrative costs
would increase; if some of the burden were shifted on to farmers (e.g., to supply
information about their own soils), compliance costs would increase. Even the best
models have not yet reached a point where they can be used regularly to provide
accurate estimates of pollution losses.'
D. Economic Incentives
Like design standards, the environmental impact of design incentives depends on
the farm-level variables targeted by the incentives. Some variables might be highly
correlated with pollution flows in particular locations and at particular times but
only weakly correlated at other locations or times. Unlike design standards,
however, the environmental impact of design incentives also depends on the effects
of the incentives on farm-level decision making. For example, the potential
economic impacts of fertilizer taxes have been the subject of a number of studies.5'
These studies demonstrate that the impacts of fertilizer taxes would depend on a
variety of hard-to-predict factors, especially the price responsiveness of fertilizer
demand. The literature generally suggests that fertilizer demand is not highly
responsive to fertilizer prices, at least in the short run. If this were true, high tax
rates would be needed to significantly reduce fertilizer use.
Performance incentives suffer from similar problems of control over farm-level
decision variables. For example, the environmental impact of a tax on excess
nitrogen per acre (nitrogen from fertilizer and manure left over after uptake by
crops) would depend on a whole host of economic factors, including the price
responsiveness of fertilizer demand, the responsiveness of the stock of farm animals
to the tax on manure, and the price responsiveness of the supply of acreage to crop
and livestock production (because the tax would tend to encourage farmers to spread
production over more acres).
The effects of design incentives on farm-level incentives to control pollution and
the allocation of pollution reduction across farms depend on the degree to which the
variables targeted by the incentives are correlated with pollution flows. For
example, fertilizer taxes cannot be designed to discriminate well between polluted
and nonpolluted watersheds, or between polluting and nonpolluting farms within

INsTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF SOIL CONSERVATION PROJECTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN 28-29 (World Bank Environment Paper No. 8, 1994).

50. See

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SOIL AND WATER QUALITY:

AN AGENDA

FOR

AGRICULTURE (1993).

51. See, e.g., Alison Burrell, The DemandforFertilizerin the United Kingdom, 40 J. AGRIC. ECON.
1 (1989); Mark Denbaly & Harry Vroomen, Dynamic Fertilizer Nutrient Demands for Corn: A
Cointegratedand Error-CorrectingSystem, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 203 (1993); Wen-yuan Huang &
Michael Le Blanc, Market-Based Incentives for Addressing Non-Point Water Quality Problems: A
Residual Nitrogen Tax Approach, 16 REv. AGRIC. ECON. 427 (1994); Taylor et al., supra note 45, at
180-81.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss2/13

1995]

ALTERNATIVE POLLUTION CONTROLS

watersheds. Absent significant expenditures on enforcement, any attempt to
discriminate in this regard could be easily evaded, particularly at the state level
where the tax could only be enforced at within-state fertilizer supply points.
Performance incentives do better on this score. For example, in the case of nitrogen
losses, excess nitrogen is more highly correlated with runoff and leaching than
fertilizer applications.' A tax on purchased nitrogen fertilizer would encourage
producers to substitute other sources of nitrogen for purchased fertilizer, partially
defeating the objective of the tax, whereas a tax on excess nitrogen would make
such a substitution pointless.
Performance incentives do better than design incentives regarding farm-level
incentive effects and inter-farm allocative effects. A number of studies have
demonstrated that incentives applied directly to estimated soil loss can reduce soil
loss at less cost to farmers than incentives applied to particular erosion control
practices.53 Similarly, several recent studies have indicated that excess nitrogen can
be reduced at lower cost to farmers by the application of incentives directly to
excess nitrogen than to fertilizer or other nutrient management practices.'
In a static economic setting, the costs of administering and enforcing incentives
would not differ too much from their counterpart standards. These costs would
range from moderate to large in the cases of design incentives and standards, and
moderate to prohibitive in the cases of performance incentives and standards. In a
dynamic economic setting, however, the levels of incentives might need to be
adjusted periodically to maintain their effectiveness. For example, the long-term
trend in real (inflation-adjusted) prices of farm products is downward; real prices
are significantly lower now than they were fifty years ago." This means, for
example, that a tax on excess nitrogen set today at a level sufficient to achieve
water quality goals at a reasonable cost to farmers might subsequently become very
high relative to crop and livestock prices.
One important advantage of performance incentives, in general, is that they have
good innovation effects. Because producers are taxed or subsidized on the basis of
their environmental performance, they have a clear incentive to adopt new
technologies to improve their performance. This incentive, in turn, gives rise to
incentives to develop new pollution prevention or abatement technologies. In the
case of nonpoint pollution, however, some of the advantages of performance
incentives are lost because of the need to use estimated performance measures rather
than actual performance measures.
For reasons noted above, incentives entail a high environmental risk relative to
other policy options. The incentives offered may or may not be sufficient in any
one place or at any one point in time to induce the desired changes in farmers'

52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 266.
53. See, e.g., McSweeny & Shortle, supra note 48, at 100-01.
54. See, e.g., Huang & Le Blanc, supra note 51, at 435-36.
55. Compare the producer price index for farm products with other producer price indices in
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, STATISTICAL TABLES RELATING TO INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND
PRODUCTION, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 347-51 (1995).
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behavior. Insufficient incentives would fail to meet pollution reduction objectives,
while overly strong incentives would reduce pollution by more than the economically efficient amount.
E. Marketable Pennits
Marketable permits could be issued for inputs correlated with pollution or for
emissions as estimated by formulas such as those mentioned above. In either case,
as scarce "commodity" permits would acquire a price, with farmers wishing to
augment their permit holdings purchasing from farmers willing to sell their holdings.
The fact that a permit could only be bought at a price would raise the cost to the
farm of inputs or estimated emissions. Even farms using no more than their initial
allocation of permits would always face an opportunity cost because they could have
sold those permits to someone else.
Provided that pernaits were issued for estimated emissions and provided that
estimated emissions were closely correlated with actual emissions, they would do
very well with respect to environmental impact and environmental risk. Since the
total number of permits is always fixed, the regulatory agency can restrict the
number to achieve whatever environmental protection goal is desired. Moreover,
given that the permit system were adequately enforced, the agency could be sure
that this goal would be met, apart from variability in actual emissions owing to the
weather and other random factors.
Under these conditions, permits also do well regarding farm-level incentive,
innovation, and inter-farm allocative effects. Since (estimated) pollution would have
a market price, farms would have strong incentives to control pollution, including
the use of new pollution prevention or abatement technologies. Moreover, the
regulatory agency would not need to know anything about the costs of controlling
pollution on one farm versus another in order to optimally allocate the reduction in
pollution across farms. Through permit trading, producers could sort this matter out
for themselves. The beauty of a price system is that the market price conveys
information about supply and demand conditions, saving everyone the cost of
collecting this information separately. In this case, the price of a permit signals
what farms with high costs of pollution control are willing to pay and what farms
with low costs of control are willing to accept.
Administration, enforcement, and compliance costs would probably not be too
much of a burden. Farmers are quite familiar with participating in auctions and
other competitive fcrums. Owing to federal farm commodity programs, they are
also quite familiar with external constraints on resource use in the form of output
quotas and acreage restrictions. Similarly, agricultural agencies, at least at the
federal level, have considerable experience in administering such programs.
The advantages of a marketable permit system could break down if the market
for permits were "thin." Suppose that the farms in some watershed were relatively
similar to each other in terms of the costs of controlling emissions. In this case,
farms would have little to gain from trading permits. The allocation of emission
permits across farms in this setting would closely correspond to the initial allocation
of permits, so that we would basically find ourselves back in the case of perfor-
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mance standards (the standards being the initial permit allocations). The advantages
of marketable permits are only realized to the extent that farms are different from
each other.
V. Conclusions
It should be evident that there is no "one size fits all" solution to controlling
nonpoint source agricultural pollution. However, policies that target estimated
performance are probably better than policies that target design, provided that
performance is estimated in a relatively simple yet reliable manner (e.g., excess
nitrogen). More complicated methods of estimation involving simulation models are
not practical for policy making purposes at this time. Within the class of
performance-based instruments, marketable permits appear to be superior to
performance incentives on most of the policy evaluation criteria. Permits are also
superior to performance standards, provided that the farms subject to regulation
differ enough from each other in order to make an active permit market. If farms
are relatively homogenous, there is little point in trying to set up a permit market,
and performance standards might as well be used.
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